In recent years, Cloud services have become an important part of people's lives, providing them with a large amount of IT resources, available from anywhere and at any time. The access to the services offered is controlled basing on users' identification credentials. As people acquire services from multiple cloud providers, in order to avoid the proliferation of identities associated to a single user, new crossorganization authentication methods, allowing the authorized transfer of users' identification data from one Cloud to another, are emerging. However, since most of these techniques do not protect adequately users' private information, attackers can easily intercept and tamper with confidential identity-related messages. In this paper, we use the characteristics of blind signatures to support user verification of the registering provider, to protect the user's identity, and to address known vulnerabilities in these systems. In addition, we use a strong designated verifier signature with message recovery characteristics to strengthen data communication security in the whole process.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud-based services are experiencing a rapid development in the last years due to their lower costs and to their improved flexibility and scalability in dynamically growing together with the workload demands. However, as the use of these technologies become widespread, new security requirements and challenges associated with them emerge at a rapid pace.
From the cloud provider point of view, user identification is one of the most critical issues in order to allow the subscribers to access the available services based on their own secure credentials. Furthermore, the account information kept by provider organizations are associated with contains the user's personal data (gender, address, credit card numbers, etc.) that may become the target of fraud attacks, identity theft, etc. Therefore, each involved cloud provider must guarantee the safety and privacy of such personal In this scenario, the OpenID standard (Recordon, D., & Reed, D., 2006) for user-centric digital identity, has gained crescent popularity because of its open and decentralized nature, becoming the solution of choice for the implementation of inter-cloud federated authentication. It is able to achieve crossapplication and cross-domain SSO (Armando A. et al., 2013 ) ( Kurdi H. et al., 2014) (Tormo G. D., 2014) allowing service providers to delegate the authentication of their users to other identity providers, greatly reducing the maintenance costs associated to the management of user credentials. At the state-of-the-art Google, like Yahoo! provides a federated login solution implemented by using OpenID 2.0, but is migrating to OpenID Connect 1.0 and OAuth 2.0, also supported by MS Azure in its Active Directory implementation as well as from RackSpace and Amazon Cognito. An OpenID-as-a-service solution for OpenStack has been proposed in (R. Khan, J. Ylitalo, and A. Ahmed, 2011) . however, it uses only a single cloud organization to scale the OpenID service, which is susceptible to several threats and performance issues.
Despite its wide acceptance in the cloud arena OpenID is essentially a lightweight solution to be used only in the most "trivial" identity management tasks, typically not involving strategic activities. This is because OpenID is not recognized as a trust system, suffers from several usability problems, is known to be highly vulnerable to phishing and other attacks, introduces critical privacy problems, and hence makes it unappealing to become an OpenID end-user or provider (Brands, S., 2007) .
Starting for these considerations, in this work we proposed a new decentralized model for inter-cloud identity management that addresses the known vulnerabilities in the OpenID system by using the characteristics of blind signatures to support verification of the registering provider, protect the user's identity, and ensure enough degree of trust between all the involved entities and resistance to the most common attacks. Being simple and effective in its implementation and interaction mechanisms among the involved parties, it also improves the usability and seamless Single-Sign-On experience for the users. In addition, the proposed framework relies on a strong designated verifier signature with message recovery characteristics to strengthen data security and reduce the amount of communication between Clouds.
BACKGROUND
This section briefly introduces some of the basic concepts that will be useful in explaining the proposed digital identity management framework, by presenting the current technological scenario as well as the fundamental architectural elements behind it.
Security Problems in OpenID
OpenID is a passive protocol, allowing users to access multiple services by using the same digital identity. It is based on the concept of relayed authentication implemented by using simple mechanisms such as web redirections to communicate between the relying party and the remote identity provider (IdP). Furthermore, OpenID does not need to build a token containing security attributes, but rather uses HTTP query strings or POST Form elements to convey separate fields, greatly reducing the complexity without the need of a specific parsing activity. In particular, the OpenID protocol allows a user to declare its identity when communicating with a relying party that can be, for example, an application or a Web site that needs to check its identity on an external identity provider. Such communication is achieved by exchanging an identifier (the OpenID) that is the XRI or URL adopted by the user to declare its identity. Such exchange is performed by a "User-Agent" (that usually is a browser) adopted by the user in the communication between the relying party and the OpenID provider.
The identity provider is located by using the Yadis discovery protocol (Miller, J., 2006) and all the communication between the relying party and the identity provider is secured by using a shared key negotiated through the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (Diffie, W., & Hellman, M.,1976) . The whole schema is simply sketched in the following Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1. The OpenID authentication scheme
Despite its simplicity and use of proved technologies and mechanisms, OpenID starting from its first appearance has been considered insecure from the worldwide community. In fact, in 2005 OpenID Foundation published a circular report (OpenID Foundation, 2005) warning all the OpenID users about vulnerabilities in the Attribute Exchange process allows an attacker to alter or disclose the users' personal information to be potentially used in subsequent hostile activities. Several other studies identified open security weaknesses in OpenID, involving lack of privacy and failure in addressing the trust problem (Sun, S. T., Hawkey, K., & Beznosov, K., 2012 ) (van Delft, B., & Oostdijk, M., 2010 (Brands, S., 2007) . They asserted that OpenID is proven to be vulnerable to phishing attacks. As an example, an hostile party may decide to route the user to a fake authentication page requesting the user to provide its credentials. After that, the hostile party (who controls also the fake authentication page) will have access to the user's credentials within the identity provider and it will be able to employ the user's OpenID with different services. Furthermore, (Barth et al., 2008) proved how the OpenID is exposed to the attack named "session swapping" that is an attack in which the user's browser is forced to initialized a Web session by authenticating him as the attacker. An additional crucial vulnerability arises associated to the URL redirection from the IdP to the relying entity, in the concluding step of the authentication scheme when the TLS/SSL protocol is not adopted for ensuring end-to-end security. The issue with that redirection is the replay attack: in fact whoever will be able to know that URL (by means of several network attacks, such as sniffing and so on) will be able to replay it and impersonate the attacked user on the authenticating Web site. Luckily, the adoption of the TLS/SSL protocol during the authentication phase, gets rid of this risk. In a similar way, (Sovis, P., Kohlar, F., & Schwenk, I., 2010) analyzed the OpenID extension protocol and realized that some extension parameters, if not using a TLS/SSL channel, could be faked. This attack is usually known as "parameter forgery" attack. To sum up, the absence of authentication and encryption in several parts of the protocols leads to the above-mentioned security issues. Clearly, the main consequence is that an attacker can easily tamper the communication between the involved parties or introduce some malicious relay or identity provider entity in order to acquire or modify the user secret credentials or attributes. Therefore, we propose a more secure inter-cloud authentication process relying on blind signatures and designated verifier schemes to cope with all the above security issues.
Blind Signatures
A blind signature is a particular type of digital signature that hides the content of the involved message before signing it. However, such kind of signature allows verification on the original, clear text message as in normal digital signature mechanisms. The original blind signature scheme, based on traditional RSA digital signatures, has been introduced in (Chaum, D., 1982) , as an effective method for signing and hence authenticating digital messages without the need of knowing their contents as well as the signatures that will be used by the recipients, and without exposing the identity of the original message's author for which authentication is performed. The signing entities need to protect their own private keys and to perform distribution, through proper authentication channels, of their associated public keys, to be used for later verification, like in traditional digital signature paradigms.
Blind signature schemes have been implemented by using many digital signature protocols. In particular, the scheme proposed by Chaum relies on RSA signatures as follows. Let us assume that Alice produces a message M and wishes Bob to sign it, bur without knowing anything about M. If (N, e) and (N, d) are respectively the Bob's public key and his private one, then Alice can determine a random number r so that gcd(r, N) = 1 and transmit to Bob an hidden version M' of the message M, properly "blinded" by using the random number r so that:
Bob has no way of determining any kind of information about M from M' but, as requested, signs it by returning the blind signature S' to Alice, defined as:
Since S'=r M d mod N, Alice can determine the valid RSA signature S of M by calculating:
and hence obtaining a signature for M that is impossible to be generated by Alice on her own. The security of the above scheme is guaranteed by the inherent difficulty of performing factoring and root extraction on large numbers. The signature scheme is ensured to be definitely "blind" by the random nature of r, that does not allow the signer to acquire any information about the original message M even if it is able to resolve the aforementioned factoring and root extraction problems.
Blind signatures are also able to break the association between the blind signed message and a later clear text version that can be subject to following verification, by providing unlinkability between the two versions, that can reveal extremely useful when anonymity is required. Accordingly such schemes have been widely used for the implementation of crypto-based services like untraceable electronic money, anonymous voting, and unlinkable credentials/attributes, achieving a kind of optimal balance between individual accountability and identity protection.
Designated Verifier Signature Schemes
The designated verifier signature concept has been at first presented in (Jakobsson, M., Sako, K., & Impagliazzo, R., 1996) as a mechanism for convincing only a specific verifier about the authenticity of a signature by associating it to a unique signer. The verifier is unable to transfer the conviction to a third party so that, only the designated verifier (or the set of designated verifiers), who is chosen in advance by the signer, can really assert that the signature is valid. Furthermore, the verification mechanism is not interactive since the signer does participate in any verification activity. This mechanism, by combining an inherent authentication facility with off-the-record messages easily allows the implementation of authenticated, private communication channels between two parties.
A designated signature scheme providing message recovery features has been introduced in (Nyberg, K., & Rueppel, R. A., 1993) , allowing simultaneous message recovery and signature verification at the recipient side. Instead, in this work we will use a more efficient strong designated verifier signature scheme proposed in ( In order to provide message recovery and verification, upon receiving the (r, MAC) pair from Alice, Bob will use the public key X of the sender and its private key y for generating a decryption key X -y = g -xy and verifies the signature by calculating:
if the verification is successful, Bob is convinced that the message m is a legal one, and its true source is Alice. This scheme has been demonstrated to be very efficient in both computation and communication respect to traditional designated verifier signature solutions.
PROVIDING SECURE CROSS-DOMAIN AUTHENTICATION
In order to address the existing systems' vulnerabilities the user's identity used in the cross-domain authentication process must be strongly protected. The available inter-cloud authentication mechanisms are known to allow identity steal by subverted or malicious relying sites or identity providers. For this reason, the proposed mechanism guarantees the user's anonymity throughout the whole process by using blind signatures to protect the data exchange between the involved parties.
In order to reduce the communication cost, and maintain strong security, the proposed scheme uses the designated verifier signature with message recovery to protect all the communication between the involved parties. The immediate advantage is that each entity does not need to communicate with the established session key, and sends an encrypted message directly. Once the encrypted message is received, the receivers can use their own private key to decrypt the message. The encrypted message also has a designated verifier signature feature, in which signatures can only be verified by a single designated verifier, explicitly chosen by the signer.
To sum up, the proposed scheme achieves the following objectives:
1. When a user signs it to access an organization requiring cross-domain authentication to a third party identity provider such organization must not expose in any way the user's identity information;
2. When a third party cloud organization requests a user's registration information, the entire process should be proof against man-in-the-middle attacks and any malicious third party entity participating to the inter-domain authentication process.
3. All the registration data exchanges should be encrypted and authenticated with strong verification of all the involved entities.
The Generic Authentication Process
The generic Cloud authentication process is structured according to a three-layers scheme, as shown in Fig. 2 .
Fig. 2. The three levels in the authentication process
First, users connect to the cloud front-end server to eventually obtain the needed Client components (adhoc applications, browser plug ins etc.), and then request the desired Cloud-based service by providing their own identity information, to be verified by the contacted provider directly or by relying through a third party identity management service. In any case involved cloud provider has to confirm the identity of the user, in order to provide access to the requested services, and ensure data transfer security during the whole negotiation process. However, the local or third party remote Security Infrastructure stores the user's registration and authorization information that is needed by the contacted cloud organization for verification checks and must provide them upon specific requests. This process is accomplished by the Authentication System, which is responsible for fetching the user identification credentials from the repository they are stored on and passing them to the requesting organization.
In typical cloud architectures, users only access the outer layer (typically through the home page or specific web service interface) of the front-end service, and do not directly connect with the internal components ( 
The Inter-Cloud Authentication Process
The proposed cross-domain user authentication scheme is sketched in Fig. 3 . First, the user, already registered in Cloud A organization, chooses Cloud B to sign in, according to the following procedure:
1. The user requires access to Cloud B services, by encrypting its identity. It generates a blind message to Cloud B, and Cloud B signs the blind signature.
2. The user also sends the unblind signature message to Cloud A organization.
3. Cloud B sends the blind signature to Cloud A, and Cloud A now has both the unblind signature message, and the blind signature one.
First, Cloud
A unblinds the signature, and verifies whether Cloud B is a legitimate member of the identity provider federation or not. After the verification, the user's registration information is encrypted by the message recovery, and Cloud A then sends the message to Cloud B.
5. Once Cloud B receives the encrypted message, it uses its private key to decrypt and verify messages. Cloud B can now obtain the user's identity and personal information to be used in its authorization process. 
The Protocol Details
In order to describe the protocol details the following notation is used throughout the paper: According to the schemes sketched in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , we design a new cross-organization authentication method, allowing the authorized transfer of users' identification data from a Cloud organization to another one, in order to avoid the proliferation of identities associated to each single user. We use the characteristics of blind signatures to support user's verification on the registering provider by also protecting the user's identity. The whole process is sketched in Fig. 4 .
Step 1: The user chooses a website, and selects a registration identity Step 4: Once Cloud B receives the message sent by Cloud A, Cloud B uses Cloud A's public key PK A and its own private key SK B to decrypt the received message as follows. 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme and discuss the possible attacks against it. According to the general security practices and the most common services requirements, the most important security issues related to cloud access are authentication and anonymity. Therefore, we will focus on these issues in order to analyze how the most common kind of menaces can affect the proposed scheme, by studying its robustness and tolerance against them.
Authentication
The main vulnerability of the OpenID system resides in the fact that an attacker can provide a service supplier with the user's identity, and then obtain the user's personal information without authentication. In our proposed protocol, the user must inform the Cloud where to register a new identity, and give the unblind factor C . In this way, our scheme totally guarantees user's anonymity.
Robustness against Man-in-the-middle Attacks

2
C is protected by the public key A PK , and only Cloud A can decrypt it. Therefore, attackers cannot perform man-in-the-middle attacks on 2 C . Moreover, the security of 3 C is based on the difficulty of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), and the session key is built by Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanism ) (
. However, an attacker must have both the public and private keys to decrypt 3 C , which is otherwise impossible to decrypt.
Robustness against Server Spoofing Attacks
Sometimes attackers can pretend to be a server so as to manipulate the sensitive data of legal users. In our scheme, this is impossible, since, if an attacker wants to pretend to be a server operating within the federated authentication process, it must first pass the original server authentication. On the other hand, the attacker cannot masquerade as a user to register in a legal Cloud. When a user wants to register with a new Cloud, they need to authorize in by obtaining the original Cloud permission, and verify whether the Cloud is authorized or not. If the Cloud does not get the authorization or is blacklisted by the federation, then the user's personal information will not be provided to the supplier. So attackers cannot perform server spoofing attacks.
OpenID is also known to be vulnerable to phishing attacks (Laurie, B., 2007) , where a malicious relying entity performs redirection to a phishing website in order to catch the user's authentication credentials. Analogously to the aforementioned considerations concerning server spoofing attacks, an attacker cannot pretend to be an authentication entity (and hence a recognized IdP) without passing in advance the intercloud server authentication checks, so that if the involved Cloud does not get the authorization by the federation, then the user's credentials will not be provided in any way to the phishing site.
Robustness against Eavesdropping Attacks
In eavesdropping attacks, an attacker listens to the communication channel between the client and server, and then tries to obtain the user's private message (personal information, password, etc). Our scheme is robust against these kind of attacks due to the following reasons: 
CONCLUSION
A new security scheme has been proposed as a flexible solution inter-cloud authentication within a crossdomain framework. It should be highly useful in easing the diffusion and deployment of federated digital identity management infrastructures in the cloud arena, thus overcoming most of the security and privacy worries, which negatively influence the establishment of cross-authentication agreements between different organizations.
The adoption of this scheme has the immediate effect of reducing the number of perceivable authentications when accessing resources on different cloud organizations, letting users to transparently log-in to many different cloud services provided by multiple organizations that recognize identities issued by other domains within a federation, by using a single "home" identity, and hence greatly enhancing the quality of usage experience in multi-domain federated environments.
Great efforts have been invested in trying to improve the communication efficiency, while ensuring anonymity of user's own data and secure interaction among the various components, resulting in the enhancement of the robustness of the whole system. By introducing such scheme, malicious entities are no more able to implement most of the known attacks based on man-in-the-middle, server spoofing and eavesdropping practices.
